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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No. 860221-CA 
v . t 
ALLEN TIM HEFNER, : P r i o r i t y No. 2 
Def end an t -AppelIan t . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant , A l l e n Tim Hefner , was charged wi th B u r g l a r y , 
a s e c o n d - d e g r e e f e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 2 
( 1 9 7 8 ) ; T h e f t , a s e c o n d - d e g r e e f e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code 
Ann. a 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Aggravated Arson, a s e c o n d - d e g r e e f e l o n y , 
in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 1 0 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; and Arson, a 
t h i r d - d e g r e e f e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 1 0 2 
(1978) . 
Defendant was c o n v i c t e d of B u r g l a r y , aggravated a r s o n , 
and a r s o n , in a jury t r i a l he ld May 2 8 , 1 9 8 6 , in the Second 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court , in and for Weber County, S t a t e of Utah, 
the Honorable Ronald 0 . Hyde, p r e s i d i n g . Defendant was sentenced 
by Judge Hyde on June 1 3 , 1 9 8 6 , t o s e r v e a term in the Utah S t a t e 
P r i s o n of not l e s s than one year nor more than 15 y e a r s for the 
burg lary o f f e n s e ; no t l e s s than one year nor more than 15 y e a r s 
for the aggravated arson o f f e n s e ; and not t o exceed f i v e y e a r s 
for committ ing a r s o n . These s e n t e n c e s were t o run c o n c u r r e n t l y . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 16 , 1986 at 12:45 a.m., Oyden City f i r e and 
p o l i c e departments responded to a f i r e at 1530 21st S t r e e t . When 
they arr ived, they found that the f i r e was rayiny simultaneously 
in a house and a yarage which were 60 f e e t apart and not 
connected in any way (R. 110) • 
Robert Lee, the owner of both s t r u c t u r e s , learned of 
the f i r e over h i s C.B. radio and hurried to the scene (R. 179-
8 0 ) . Upon arr iv ing , he informed Pol ice Officer David Stevens he 
suspected that defendant, Allen Tim Hefner, had s tarted the blaze 
(R. 116 ) . He based h is susp ic ions on previous experiences with 
defendant . 1 Lee then accompanied the p o l i c e to defendant's home 
to see i f defendant's car , a tan Volkswagon Rabbit, was parked 
there . I t was not (R. 121-22) . 
1
 Lee had known defendant s ince 1977 when he met him over the 
C.B. radio (R. 170) . Defendant i s an avid C.B. operator and has 
the "handle" or code name of "Florida Fox" (R. 164) . Lee, as the 
owner of Oyden Industr ia l P l a s t i c s , has a lso employed defendant 
twice because defendant asked for a 30b (R. 172 ) . The f i r s t time 
was after Lee's f i r s t factory was h i t by l ightn ing and destroyed 
by f i r e (R. 172, 187, 237 ) . Defendant l e f t Lee's employ nine 
months before defendant s e t Lee^s second plant on f i r e (R. 187, 
268 ) . Defendant a l s o worked with Lee on pro jec t s at the 
garage / f ibery las s fabr icat ion shop that burned down as a r e s u l t 
of the April 16 , 1986 f i r e (R. 182 -83 ) . 
Lee t e s t i f i e d unwi l l ingly at defendant's previous t r i a l in 1984. 
Because of t h i s , defendant became anyry with Lee (R. 174, 282) 
and placed many threatening phone c a l l s to Lee and members of 
Lee's family at a l l hours of the day and n ight . These c a l l s were 
reg i s tered by the phone company (R. 174-76) . There was a lso a 
• b u l l ' s eye" painted on the d r i v e r ' s s ide window of the ir car (R. 
176) . 
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John Grant, who l ived in the house for the three years 
previous to the f i r e (R. 154) , 2 was working the grave-yard s h i f t 
for Oyden City in the s t r e e t maintenance department when the f i r e 
was started (R. 155) . He was informed by Po l i ce Officer Joe 
Coxey that there was a f i r e on the block where h i s residence was 
located (R. 157) . Grant suspected i t was h i s residence that was 
on f i r e s ince he had been informed by defendant's son f Michael, 
that Grant was l i v i n g in a "war zone" and had 30 days to move out 
of the home (R. 157) . 
After the f i r e was ext inguished, Grant found that s ix 
p ieces of h i s C.B. radio equipment had been removed from the 
house. The s t o l e n equipment was valued at $ 2 , 0 0 0 . 3 Nothing e l s e 
in the home or shop was taken. This was unusual s ince Grant had 
other valuables in the house such as four t e l e v i s i o n s , a 
microwave, and firearms (R. 160-63) . Lee estimated that the 
value of his property destroyed in the f i r e was $124,242 (R. 87-
88 ) . He a lso l o s t a government contract valued at $249,000 
because h i s spec ia l i zed equipment was destroyed (R. 170) . 
Shortly after the f i r e , Inspector Winston Sales of the 
Oyden Fire Department was asked to i n v e s t i g a t e the blaze (R. 
126) . «.s Sales determined the cause of the f i r e , he discovered 
an uncapped gas can laying on i t s s ide in the l i v i n g room area 
(R. 129, 130, 131) . I t s contents had been poured onto the f l o o r , 
2 Lee owned the house but did not res ide there . 
3
 During the evening of April 15 , 1986, the C.B. equipment and a 
12-inch black and white t e l e v i s i o n s e t were a l so s t o l e n out of 
Grant's truck (R. 159, 162) . 
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causing a "puddling e f f ec t" which i s typica l in non-accidental 
f i r e s (R. 133 ) . The can s t i l l contained traces of gaso l ine (R. 
200, 207) . Samples taken from the house indicated that petroleum 
presets had keen ppvred onto them (R. 146). 
Sales a l s o discovered that the front l e f t burner of the 
kitchen s tove was l e f t on high (R. 134) . Grant t e s t i f i e d at 
t r i a l that he had not used the stove for a day and a half (R. 
156 ) . Another indicat ion of arson-re lated a c t i v i t y was the fac t 
that three separate f i r e s were started in the house: the l i v i n g 
room (R. 132, 145 ) , the kitchen (R. 135 ) , and the back porch (R. 
138-39) • Other factors were the low-burning nature of the f i r e , 
the high amount of metal fa t igue and g l a s s damage which indicate 
a hot , fast-burning f i r e (R. 133-35 ) . There was a l s o a ladder 
leaning up against the exter ior west window of the garage (R. 
142 ) . This provided access to the f i b e r g l a s s fabr ica t ion shop in 
the garage where flammable substances were kept such as r e s i n s , 
methylethyl keytone (MEK), acetones , and thinners (R. 141 ) . 
Sales t e s t i f i e d that the f i r e department uses MEK to 
s e t f i r e s for pract ice purposes s ince i t has a low "flash point" 
and i s extremely v o l a t i l e . MEK i s a highly flammable l iqu id (R. 
• 4 -
148) . 4 
In Sa le s 1 expert opinion, the f i r e s in the home and the 
garage were non-acc idental . He based h i s opinion on the factors 
l i s t e d above and the fact that the f i r e was started both in the 
house and the garage which were separated by a great dis tance (R. 
144 ) . There was no wind blowing which would cause the f i r e to 
jump from one loca t ion to another (R. 144) . 
On the morning of April 16 , 1986, Detect ive David Lucas 
of the Ogden City Pol ice Department met with Robert Lee at Lee's 
res idence . Also present was Ronnie Williams who had known 
defendant for seven years . Williams told Lucas of a conversation 
he had with defendant outside the Ogden Community Halfway House 
in October of 1985.5 While in defendant's tan Volkswagon Rabbit 
(R. 213) , defendant talked with Williams about "torching" 
"Frog's" house (R. 210) . 6 Williams did not know who "Frog" was 
q
 Steve Clemens, a cr imino log i s t with the Weber State Crime Lab 
who has exper t i se in the area of arson, also t e s t i f i e d that MEK 
has a low f lash point of approximately 35 degrees and i s very 
flammable (R. 205) . 
Lee t e s t i f i e d concerning MEK since he was famil iar with i t s use . 
Lee contradicted both Sales and Clemens, who are experts in the 
area of flammable chemicals , and said that MEK peroxide was not 
as v o l a t i l e as acetone or gaso l ine (R. 191) . However, he did 
s t a t e that MEK peroxide was highly r e a c t i v e , e s p e c i a l l y with 
metals (R. 182) , and creates i t s own oxygen as i t burns, becoming 
extremely hazardous (R. 192) . He a l s o added that there was 
acetone in the shop which i g n i t e s e a s i l y with a spark (R. 182) . 
Lee t e s t i f i e d that he would not consider himself an expert in the 
flammability of l i q u i d s (R. 194) . 
5 Williams was at the halfway house for committing a felony (R. 
209) . He was on parole at the time of t r i a l (R. 214) . 
* Williams noticed that defendant's car had a s t ereo with 
speakers in the back but did not observe any emblems or s t i c k e r s 
in the car (R. 212-13) . 
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at the time but l a t e r found out that i t was Lee f s "handle" or 
code name over the C.B. radio (R. 210-11) . Defendant showed 
Williams a large sum of money (approximately $500 to $1,000) but 
Williams refused to do the job for him (R. 210) . Defendant said 
that he wanted Frog's house torched as a personal vendetta but 
did not want to do i t himself for fear that he would get caught 
(R. 211) . 
When Williams told t h i s story to h i s wi fe f she 
suyyested that they t e l l Lee whom she had come to know over the 
C.B. radio while Williams was a t the halfway house. Lee than 
contacted the p o l i c e and Detec t ive Lucas requested that Williams 
make a statement at the po l i ce s t a t i o n which he did (R. 211) . He 
a l so repeated t h i s same story under oath during t r i a l without any 
promises beiny made by the county a t torney ' s o f f i c e or the po l i ce 
department in exchange for h i s testimony (R. 214) . 
After hearing t h i s story at Lee's res idence . Detec t ives 
Lucas and Buck went to defendant's house. Detec t ive Buck took 
detendant to the s t a t i o n house while Lucas remained behind to ask 
defendant's wife some quest ions (R. 216-17) . She said that 
detendant had gone f i sh ing the day before and was home a l l 
evening with her watching t . v . and videos (R. 292) . When Lucas 
confronted her with the fact the po l i ce did not see defendant's 
car parked at the house during the early hours of the morning, 
she admitted that defendant was not home a l l night (R. 292) • 
After rece iv ing t h i s story from defendant's wife and a l so 
learning from a neighbor that defendant had carried some radio 
equipment into h i s home e a r l i e r in the day, Lucas returned to the 
s t a t i o n house (R. 217, 233 ) . 
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Upon arriving a t the po l ice s t a t i o n , Lucas verbal ly 
gave defendant h i s Miranda r ight s which he waived (R. 219) . 7 
Defendant did not consider himself under arrest at the s t a t i o n 
house. He f e l t that he could leave at any time (R. 251) . After 
waiving h i s r i g h t s , defendant consented to allow Lucas to search 
h i s car and home (R. 217) • 
Detect ive Lucas and Officer Coxey returned to 
defendant's house at 4:00 p.m. on April 16 , 1986 to execute the 
search. When they arrived they asked Mrs. Hefner to give them 
the c lothing defendant was wearing the day before . She brought 
out a gray jogging top and a pair of Levis with a s ta in on the 
l e f t leg near the knee (R. 202, 217) . The s t a i n was blackish in 
c o l o r , had an odor s imi lar to airplane g lue , and was composed of 
MEK and traces of xy lene , a chemical found in gaso l ine (R. 121, 
2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ) . 8 
With t h i s evidence, Lucas returned to the s t a t i o n house 
and started talking with defendant. At f i r s t defendant repeated 
h i s w i f e ' s explantion of where he had been on April 15 and 16, 
1986. He said he had been f i sh ing with two of h i s chi ldren on 
April 15 and watched t e l e v i s i o n with his wife that evening. When 
7 These r i g h t s are spec i f i ed in frliranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) . Lucas tape-recorded t h i s part of the conversation 
without defendant's knowledge (R. 219, 297) . Lucas then started 
to have technical problems with the recorder and defendant was 
advised of the recording. He objected to i t and the recording 
stopped (R. 296) . This tape recording was played to the jury and 
admited as S t a t e ' s exh ib i t #28 (R. 4 3 ) . 
8 Defendant's w i tnes s , Chief Fire Marshall Allan Peek was allowed 
to smell the s ta in at t r i a l and made "a guess" that the substance 
was a f i b e r g l a s s r e s i n . However, Peek asserted that he had no 
exper t i se in the area of f i b e r g l a s s r e s i n s (R. 244) . 
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Lucas attempted to ascerta in which t . v . shows he watched# 
defendant 6aid that he was actual ly watching video tapes . 
Acting on a reasonable susp ic ion that defendant had 
disposed of the s t o l e n radio equipment, Lucas told him that a 
neighbor had seen defendant carrying radio equipment out of the 
house at 1530 21st S tree t and putt ing i t in h i s car (R„ 223) . 
Lucas said that would place defendant at the scene of the crime 
(R. 223) . I t was at that point that defendant told Lucas what 
r e a l l y happened. As defendant spoke, Lucas wrote down exact ly 
what he said as fo l l ows : 
Robert Lee was making i t appear over the 
radio that I was threatening him. He played 
a piece out of the tape l i k e you're a dead 
sun [ s i c ] of a b i t c h . I don't know i f that 
i s what i t was. I heard i t second hand. 
People have told me about i t . He bum-wrapped 
me l a s t time. He told Stubbs that I had told 
him that I had burnt the Hertz building down, 
which I never told Lee. I never burnt the 
building down, e i t h e r . I got drunk l a s t 
n igh t , and a combination of what I j u s t 
expla ined, I took two b o t t l e s of MEK, 
methylethyl ketone peroxide out of the fr idge 
in the garage. I s e t one on the f loor and 
l i t the top of i t . I s e t the other on the 
s tove in the house. The s tove was e l e c t r i c , 
and I turned the burner on. Then I l e f t in my 
VW rabbi t . 
(R. 221) . Lucas asked defendant i f he took anything and the 
defendant repl ied "yeah, the radio stuff" (R. 221) . «nd when 
asked to describe the radio equipment, defendant answered "five 
or s ix p i e c e s , I don't r e a l l y know. I j u s t p i l ed i t up and put 
i t in the car" (R. 222) . When asked how he entered the garage, 
defendant said "the window on the west s i d e . I e i ther climbed 
t r e e or ladder . I don' t remember for sure because I was drunk" 
(R. 222) . Defendant then said that he probably stained h i s pan 
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on "the 55 ga l lon drum in the garage" and entered the house 
through the front door (R. 222) . Defendant a lso admitted 
s t e a l i n g a radio out of a truck when he f i r s t arrived at the 
scene and disposing of the radio equipment in the Ogden River (R. 
222) . 
Lucas then had defendant wri te h is answers to two 
quest ions which were: "Do you understand your wri tes [ s i c )"? and 
•you do t h i s vo luntar i ly without an attorney"? Defendant wrote 
aff irmative answers to both quest ions (R. 220) . Lucas asked 
defendant i f he could read Lucas1 handwriting. Defendant 
responded that he could. Lucas then requested that defendant 
read through the statement which contained h i s Miranda r ights and 
the written confess ion and make any necessary correc t ions . 
Defendant read through the e n t i r e confess ion then signed h i s name 
on the cover page and a lso in the witness space below the 
sentence that s t a t e s "I have read t h i s statement and i t i s true 
and correc t ." After defendant had signed both the front and back 
pages, Lucas signed and dated the back page (R. 222, 231)• Both 
Detect ive Lucas and defendant agreed that no promises were made 
in exchange for the confess ion (R. 230, 277) .^ 
9 At one point before Lucas returned to d e f e n d a n t s house to 
execute the consent search, defendant said " I ' l l g ive you a 
statement i f you c a l l my wife ." But Lucas responded by saying "I 
can f t do that . I can' t go out and c a l l your wife . . . [Y]ou 
know, we're kind of making promises, and I can ' t do that" (R. 
230) . And even though Lucas did eventually c a l l defendant's wife 
knowing that she was not home (R. 296-97) and took defendant home 
after the confess ion was made so that he could sign some checks 
for h i s wife to cash (R. 230-31) defendant s t i l l asserted under 
oath that Lucas did not promise him anything (R. 277) . 
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At t r i a l , defendant took the stand and claimed that 
Lee, Grant# Will iams f and Lucas a l l perjured themselves during 
the t r i a l (R. 263) • He claimed that Lee confessed to him that h 
had s e t h i s previous two bus inesses on f i r e and probably s e t thi 
one on f i r e a l s o in order to avoid problems with the Internal 
Revenue Service (R. 268-271) . However, one of the defendant's 
w i t n e s s e s , Chief F ire Marshall Allan Peek refuted t h i s by 
t e s t i f y i n g that the f i r e which destroyed Lee's f i r s t business in 
1977 was caused by l ightning (R. 237) . Peek t e s t i f i e d that Lee 
was not the owner of the building and thus not the one who 
received $94,000 from the insurance company. Lee only received 
$25,000 to help him o f f s e t h i s l o s s e s (R. 240-41) . Also , Lee 
denied under oath that he s e t any of his bus inesses on f i r e (R. 
187) . 
Defendant a l so gave a d i f f e r e n t account of h is 
whereabouts on the night of April 15 and the early morning hours 
of April 16 , 1986. He claimed that he drove h is car to a grocery 
s tore and purchased some alcohol which he consumed. He then f e l l 
as leep and did not wake up u n t i l 6:00 a.m. the next morning (R. 
246-47) . Lucas t e s t i f i e d that the f i r s t time he had heard t h i s 
story was a t t r i a l (R. 292) . 
Defendant claimed that Lucas composed the confess ion 
which defendant signed (R. 254-55) . Defendant a l so a s s e r t s that 
he merely witnessed the confess ions s ince he signed i t on the 
second page in a place provided for the wi tness 1 s ignature (R. 
260) . 
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On May 28, 1986, based on the evidence presented at 
t r i a l , the jury found defendant gu i l ty of aggravated arson and 
burglary, both second-degree f e l o n i e s and arson, a third-degree 
f e lony . He was found not gu i l ty of the f t (R. 73 -76 ) . On June 
1 3 , 1986, Judge Ronald 0 . Hyde sentenced defendant to serve a 
term in the Utah State Prison of not l e s s than one year nor more 
than 15 years for the burglary o f fense ; not l e s s than one year 
nor more than 15 years for the aggravated arson offense; and not 
to exceed f i ve years for committing arson. These sentences were 
to run concurrently (R. 7 7 ) . From h i s convict ion and sentence, 
defendant now appeals (R. 98, 102) . 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at t r i a l was s u f f i c i e n t for the 
jury to convict defendant of the crimes charged. The evidence 
included a signed statement in which the defendant voluntari ly 
confessed to entering a home and garage located at 1530 21st 
Street in Ogden and s e t t i n g them on f i r e . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS. 
Defendant asserts that the evidence produced at trial 
was i n s u f f i c i e n t for the jury to convict him. He claims that 
evidence of h i s signed confess ion and other evidence was "so 
inconclus ive and unsat is factory that a reasonable mind must have 
entertained reasonable doubt as to d e f e n d a n t s g u i l t . " 
(Appel lant's brief at 4)* 
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This Court has adopted the fol lowing standard of review 
when considering a chal lenge to the su f f i c i ency of the evidence: 
The standard for determining su f f i c i ency of 
the evidence i s that the evidence be "so 
inconclus ive or so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds could not reasonably b e l i e v e 
defendant had committed a crime." State v . 
MmSLLSL, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) . xn 
determining whether evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t , 
the Court w i l l review the evidence and a l l 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
i t in the l i g h t most favorable to the ;jury 
v e r d i c t , g t e t e Vt KereKeS, 622 P.2d 1161, 
1168 (Utah 1980) . Unless there i s a c l ear 
showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict 
w i l l be upheld. State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 
811, 814 (Utah 1977) . 
State v, Gabaldon. 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 , 69 (Ct. App. April 15 , 
1987) . As noted in State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conv ic t i on , we do not 
s u b s t i t u t e our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It i s the exc lus ive funct ion of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of the wi tnesses . . . ." State 
v. Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
accord State v. Linden. Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983) . So long as there i s some 
evidence, including reasonable in ferences , 
from which f indings of a l l the r e q u i s i t e 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry s t o p s . 
Id. at 345 ( c i t a t i o n omit ted) . And, even i f the Court views the 
evidence as l e s s than wholly c o n c l u s i v e , or i f contradictory 
evidence or c o n f l i c t i n g inferences e x i s t , the verdict should be 
upheld. State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982) . In short , 
•on c o n f l i c t i n g evidence the Court i s obliged to accept the 
vers ion of the f a c t s which supports the v e r d i c t . " State v. 
I saacson. 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) ( c i t ing Stfrte V. flPWeUr 
649 P.2d at 93) . &££ £LS£, State v . Moncada. No. 860243-CA (Ut. 
Ct. App. May 1 3 , 1987) . Therefore, t h i s Court has no duty to 
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accept defendant's c o n f l i c t i n g testimony concerning the f a c t s of 
t h i s case . 
Defendant's insuf f i c iency argument i s l i t t l e more than 
a request for t h i s Court to engage in ££ novo review of the 
weight of the evidence and the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i tnes se s , and 
then to s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment for that of the jury. As i s 
evident from the authority c i t e d above, t h i s Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have s tated that they w i l l not review a criminal 
case in that fash ion . 
Defendant was convicted in the court below of 
aggravated arson, a second-degree fe lony , arson, a third-degree 
f e lony , and burglary, a second-degree f e l o n y ^ The evidence 
presented at t r i a l supports these c o n v i c t i o n s . 
The crime of buglary includes the following elements 
l i s t e d in Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 2 : 1 1 Defendant must have (a) 
entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or any port ion of a 
dwe l l ing , (b) with the intent to commit a the f t and/or felony 
and/or an assau l t there in . The elements of arson under Utah Code 
10 Defendant's brief does not make c lear whether he i s 
chal lenging h is burglary conv ic t ion . His only request of t h i s 
Court i s that "the convict ion" be reversed. All arguments in h is 
brief focus only on the f a c t s re la t ing to the acts of arson. See 
Appel lant 's Brief at 5 . 
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 76-6-202 reads: 
(1) A person i s gu i l t y of burglary i f he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assau l t on any person. 
(2) Burglary i s a felony of the third degree unless i t was 
committed in a dwel l ing , in which event i t i s a felony of the 
second degree. 
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Ann. &76-6-102 (197 8 ) 1 2 are that defendant (a) by means of f i r e 
or e x p l o s i v e s , (b) i n t e n t i o n a l l y and unlawfully damaged, (c) the 
property of another which damage exceeded $5,000. The elements 
of aggravated arson, Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-103 (1978) 1 3 are 
e s s e n t i a l l y the same except that the jury must find that 
defendant in t en t iona l ly and unlawfully damaged a habitable 
s t ruc ture by means of f i r e or e x p l o s i v e s . No damage amount i s 
s p e c i f i e d . 
-.he jury considered defendant's signed statement in 
which he confessed to (1) entering both the garage and home 
located at 1530 21st S tree t in Ogden on April 16 , 1986, (2) 
s t e a l i n g radio equipment from the home and Grant's truck, and (3) 
s e t t i n g both the home and garage on f i r e . They a l so considered 
the f a c t that defendant's Levis had been stained with MEK, the 
substance used to s e t the b laze . There was a l s o sworn testimony 
presented by both Lee and Williams to show that defendant had the 
in tent and the motive to destroy Lee's property. Based upon t h i s 
strong evidence, the jury , acting reasonably, found that 
defendant had unlawfully and i n t e n t i o n a l l y entered both the 
12 76-6-102 reads in pert inent part: 
(1) A person i s g u i l t y of arson i f , under circumstances not 
amounting to aggravated arson, by means of f i r e or e x p l o s i v e s , he 
unlawfully and i n t e n t i o n a l l y damages: 
(b) The property of another. 
(2) . . . A v i o l a t i o n of subsect ion (b) i s a felony of the 
third degree i f the damage exceeds $5,000 va lue . 
13 76-6-103 reads in pert inent part: 
1 ( 1 ) ] A person i s g u i l t y of aggravated arson i f by means of f i r e 
or exp los ive s he i n t e n t i o n a l l y and unlawfully damages: 
(a) A habitable s tructure 
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garage and home in order to s e t f i r e to the s t ruc tures . 
Accordingly f defendant was properly convicted of burglary, arson, 
and aggravated arson. 
Defendant claims that h is confess ion was not worthy of 
b e l i e f because i t was scribed by Detect ive Lucas and signed by 
defendant in the place provided for the wi tness 1 s i g n a t u r e . 1 4 
Defendant next chal lenges the c r e d i b i l i t y of the 
S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s . However, the weight and c r e d i b i l i t y given to 
wi tnesses i s l e f t e n t i r e l y to the d i s c r e t i o n of the jury. The 
test imonies of Williams and Lee were be l i evable and not i l l o g i c a l 
and contradictory as defendant c la ims . 15
 4-t no point did 
Williams or Lee contradict themselves. Their test imonies were 
l o g i c a l and straightforward .16 i t was not i l l o g i c a l for Williams 
to t e s t i f y he saw defendant with a large sum of money. I t was 
p o s s i b l e for defendant to have earned the money or to have 
obtained i t from some other source. Williams testimony was a l so 
not d i scred i ted because he f a i l e d to not i ce a s t i cker in 
1 4 Defendant does not a s s e r t that the confess ion was i l l e g a l l y 
obtained. Indeed, he was given h i s Miranda r ight s after he f i r s t 
arrived at the s t a t i o n house and l a t e r read them again as he 
proof read h i s confes s ion . He acknowledged in writ ing that he 
understood h i s r i g h t s and waived them vo luntar i ly without an 
attorney present . He ver i f i ed that he was l i t e r a t e . Defendant 
a l so t e s t i f i e d that he was not in custody but was free to go at 
a l l times and that there were no promises made in exchange for 
h i s confess ion . gee R. 273. 
1 5 Defendant s t a t e s in one part of his brief that Lee i s the only 
real expert on MEK that t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l and in another portion 
claims that Lee's testimony i s without foundation. See 
Appel lant ' s Brief at 2 and 4. 
16 The same cannot be said for defendant's test imony. He 
contradicted himself on the stand. See R. 273-74, 277. He a lso 
changed h i s a l i b i story at t r i a l (R. 247-48, 292) . 
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defendant's car which read " s l i g h t l y damaged" (R. 287) . 
Defendant could have placed the s t i c k e r on h i s dashboard after 
the conversat ion in quest ion occurred. Williams did not ice that 
defendant's car was equipped with a s t ereo and two speakers which 
were located in the back of the car . 
Defendant a l so erroneously a s s e r t s that the evidence 
presented a t t r i a l re futes the S t a t e ' s c laim that defendant's 
pants were stained with MEK, the material used to s t a r t the f i r e . 
The State had an arson expert t e s t i f y that the s ta in on the pants 
was composed of MEK and xy lene . This determination was made 
after the s ta in was tes ted s c i e n t i f i c a l l y * Defendant's w i t n e s s , 
Peek, said that he "guessed" the s t a i n was made from f i b e r g l a s s 
r e s i n . Peek claimed no exper t i se in the area of r e s i n s . 
Defendant f i n a l l y claims that "the contents of the 
document [confess ion] were t o t a l l y incons i s t en t with the F ire 
Marshalls [ s i c ] opinion of the casuation [ s i c ] of the f i r e . " 
Appel lant ' s Brief at 5. However, Chief F ire Marshall Peek never 
t e s t i f i e d as to the cause of the f i r e . He only t e s t i f i e d 
regarding the f i r e which destroyed Lee's bus iness in 1977. gee 
R. 234-43. The S t a t e , on the other hand, presented two arson 
experts who t e s t i f i e d that MEK, the substance defendant used to 
s t a r t the 1986 f i r e , i s extremely flammable and v o l a t i l e . 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and in l i g h t of the 
standard of review in t h i s ca se , the State re spec t fu l l y requests 
that defendant's conv ic t ion be affirmed. 
DATED this /* day of May, 1987. 
o&^f 7^ /C/^-j/^-^i 
CERTIFICATE OF MAHJM? 
I hereby c e r t i f y that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Kevin P. S u l l i v a n , Public Defender Assoc ia t ion , 205 26th 
S t r e e t , Sui te 1 3 , Ogden, Utah 84401, t h i s / % day of May, 1987. 
~L± 
- 1 7 -
